Efficiently mitigating transient execution attacks using the unmapped speculation contract

Efficiently mitigating transient execution attacks using the unmapped speculation contract

© 2020 Proceedings of the 14th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, OSDI 2020. All rights reserved. Today's kernels pay a performance penalty for mitigations-such as KPTI, retpoline, return stack stuffing, speculation barriers-to protect against transient execution s...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Behrens, J, Cao, A, Skeggs, C, Belay, A, Frans Kaashoek, M, Zeldovich, N
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2021
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/137797

Internet

https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/137797

Similar Items