Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs
In settings of incomplete information, we put forward (1) a very conservative -- indeed, purely set-theoretic -- model of the beliefs (including totally wrong ones) that each player may have about the payoff types of his opponents, and (2) a new and robust solution concept, based on mutual belief of...
| প্রধান লেখক: | , |
|---|---|
| বিন্যাস: | প্রবন্ধ |
| ভাষা: | en_US |
| প্রকাশিত: |
© IEEE
2022
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| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2011.11 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141710 |