Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching

Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching

<jats:p> Top trading cycles (TTC) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching. In many-to-...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Abdulkadiroǧlu, Atila, Che, Yeon-Koo, Pathak, Parag A, Roth, Alvin E, Tercieux, Olivier
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: American Economic Association 2022
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/145198

Internet

https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/145198

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