ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM
We compare market returns associated with firms' creation of new units focused on e-business. Two aspects of organization design - governance and leadership - are considered with regard to exploitation - and exploration-oriented organization learning. We find that exploitation in governance (hi...
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Format: | Working Paper |
Language: | en_US |
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2006
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30608 |
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author | Carroll, Timothy N. Hunter, Starling D. |
author_facet | Carroll, Timothy N. Hunter, Starling D. |
author_sort | Carroll, Timothy N. |
collection | MIT |
description | We compare market returns associated with firms' creation of new units focused on e-business. Two aspects of organization design - governance and leadership - are considered with regard to exploitation - and exploration-oriented organization learning. We find that exploitation in governance (high centralization) is associated with a lower mean and variance in returns; that exploitation in leadership (appointment of outsiders) is associated with the same mean yet higher variance; and, among units exhibiting both modes of learning, the variance of returns are not equal. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:08:21Z |
format | Working Paper |
id | mit-1721.1/30608 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | en_US |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:08:21Z |
publishDate | 2006 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/306082019-04-12T13:40:50Z ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM Carroll, Timothy N. Hunter, Starling D. e-business corporate governance leadership exploitation We compare market returns associated with firms' creation of new units focused on e-business. Two aspects of organization design - governance and leadership - are considered with regard to exploitation - and exploration-oriented organization learning. We find that exploitation in governance (high centralization) is associated with a lower mean and variance in returns; that exploitation in leadership (appointment of outsiders) is associated with the same mean yet higher variance; and, among units exhibiting both modes of learning, the variance of returns are not equal. 2006-01-13T18:35:07Z 2006-01-13T18:35:07Z 2006-01-13T18:35:07Z Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30608 en_US MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper 4563-05 293744 bytes application/pdf application/pdf |
spellingShingle | e-business corporate governance leadership exploitation Carroll, Timothy N. Hunter, Starling D. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM |
title | ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM |
title_full | ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM |
title_fullStr | ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM |
title_full_unstemmed | ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM |
title_short | ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM |
title_sort | organizational design organizational learning and the market value of the firm |
topic | e-business corporate governance leadership exploitation |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30608 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT carrolltimothyn organizationaldesignorganizationallearningandthemarketvalueofthefirm AT hunterstarlingd organizationaldesignorganizationallearningandthemarketvalueofthefirm |