ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM

We compare market returns associated with firms' creation of new units focused on e-business. Two aspects of organization design - governance and leadership - are considered with regard to exploitation - and exploration-oriented organization learning. We find that exploitation in governance (hi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Carroll, Timothy N., Hunter, Starling D.
Format: Working Paper
Language:en_US
Published: 2006
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30608
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author Carroll, Timothy N.
Hunter, Starling D.
author_facet Carroll, Timothy N.
Hunter, Starling D.
author_sort Carroll, Timothy N.
collection MIT
description We compare market returns associated with firms' creation of new units focused on e-business. Two aspects of organization design - governance and leadership - are considered with regard to exploitation - and exploration-oriented organization learning. We find that exploitation in governance (high centralization) is associated with a lower mean and variance in returns; that exploitation in leadership (appointment of outsiders) is associated with the same mean yet higher variance; and, among units exhibiting both modes of learning, the variance of returns are not equal.
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spelling mit-1721.1/306082019-04-12T13:40:50Z ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM Carroll, Timothy N. Hunter, Starling D. e-business corporate governance leadership exploitation We compare market returns associated with firms' creation of new units focused on e-business. Two aspects of organization design - governance and leadership - are considered with regard to exploitation - and exploration-oriented organization learning. We find that exploitation in governance (high centralization) is associated with a lower mean and variance in returns; that exploitation in leadership (appointment of outsiders) is associated with the same mean yet higher variance; and, among units exhibiting both modes of learning, the variance of returns are not equal. 2006-01-13T18:35:07Z 2006-01-13T18:35:07Z 2006-01-13T18:35:07Z Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30608 en_US MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper 4563-05 293744 bytes application/pdf application/pdf
spellingShingle e-business
corporate governance
leadership
exploitation
Carroll, Timothy N.
Hunter, Starling D.
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM
title ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM
title_full ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM
title_fullStr ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM
title_full_unstemmed ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM
title_short ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING, AND THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM
title_sort organizational design organizational learning and the market value of the firm
topic e-business
corporate governance
leadership
exploitation
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30608
work_keys_str_mv AT carrolltimothyn organizationaldesignorganizationallearningandthemarketvalueofthefirm
AT hunterstarlingd organizationaldesignorganizationallearningandthemarketvalueofthefirm