Observations on Cognitive Judgments
It is obvious to anyone familiar with the rules of the game of chess that a king on an empty board can reach every square. It is true, but not obvious, that a knight can reach every square. Why is the first fact obvious but the second fact not? This paper presents an analytic theory of a class...
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Language: | en_US |
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2004
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/5972 |
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author | McAllester, David |
author_facet | McAllester, David |
author_sort | McAllester, David |
collection | MIT |
description | It is obvious to anyone familiar with the rules of the game of chess that a king on an empty board can reach every square. It is true, but not obvious, that a knight can reach every square. Why is the first fact obvious but the second fact not? This paper presents an analytic theory of a class of obviousness judgments of this type. Whether or not the specifics of this analysis are correct, it seems that the study of obviousness judgments can be used to construct integrated theories of linguistics, knowledge representation, and inference. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:30:43Z |
id | mit-1721.1/5972 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | en_US |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:30:43Z |
publishDate | 2004 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/59722019-04-10T17:24:30Z Observations on Cognitive Judgments McAllester, David obviousness automated reasoning natural language smathematical induction theorem proving tractable inference It is obvious to anyone familiar with the rules of the game of chess that a king on an empty board can reach every square. It is true, but not obvious, that a knight can reach every square. Why is the first fact obvious but the second fact not? This paper presents an analytic theory of a class of obviousness judgments of this type. Whether or not the specifics of this analysis are correct, it seems that the study of obviousness judgments can be used to construct integrated theories of linguistics, knowledge representation, and inference. 2004-10-04T14:24:25Z 2004-10-04T14:24:25Z 1991-12-01 AIM-1340 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/5972 en_US AIM-1340 10 p. 1015767 bytes 792929 bytes application/postscript application/pdf application/postscript application/pdf |
spellingShingle | obviousness automated reasoning natural language smathematical induction theorem proving tractable inference McAllester, David Observations on Cognitive Judgments |
title | Observations on Cognitive Judgments |
title_full | Observations on Cognitive Judgments |
title_fullStr | Observations on Cognitive Judgments |
title_full_unstemmed | Observations on Cognitive Judgments |
title_short | Observations on Cognitive Judgments |
title_sort | observations on cognitive judgments |
topic | obviousness automated reasoning natural language smathematical induction theorem proving tractable inference |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/5972 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT mcallesterdavid observationsoncognitivejudgments |