Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result
This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivale...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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Society for Economic Theory
2011
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61735 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 |
| _version_ | 1811093392993550336 |
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| author | Pathak, Parag Sethuraman, Jay |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Pathak, Parag Sethuraman, Jay |
| author_sort | Pathak, Parag |
| collection | MIT |
| description | This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in
assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school
student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that
a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating
students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are
indi fferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifi es and
uni es all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the
way, two new mechanisms|Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random
Endowment|are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms
generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be
appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:44:32Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/61735 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:44:32Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Society for Economic Theory |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/617352022-09-29T15:52:29Z Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result Pathak, Parag Sethuraman, Jay Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Pathak, Parag Pathak, Parag This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indi fferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifi es and uni es all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms|Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment|are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem. National Science Foundation (U.S.) (grant SES-0924555) National Science Foundation (U.S.) (grant CMMI-0916453) 2011-03-18T19:09:38Z 2011-03-18T19:09:38Z 2010-06 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1933-6837 1555-7561 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61735 Pathak, Parag and Jay Sethuraman. "Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result" Theoretical Economics, 6.1 (January 2011), 1–17. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 en_US Theoretical Economics Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Society for Economic Theory MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Pathak, Parag Sethuraman, Jay Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result |
| title | Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result |
| title_full | Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result |
| title_fullStr | Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result |
| title_full_unstemmed | Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result |
| title_short | Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result |
| title_sort | lotteries in student assignment an equivalence result |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61735 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT pathakparag lotteriesinstudentassignmentanequivalenceresult AT sethuramanjay lotteriesinstudentassignmentanequivalenceresult |