Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result
This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivale...
Main Authors: | Pathak, Parag, Sethuraman, Jay |
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Andre forfattere: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Sprog: | en_US |
Udgivet: |
Society for Economic Theory
2011
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Online adgang: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61735 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-3864 |
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