Position Auctions with Consumer Search
This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about rm qualities and search optimally....
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
Harvard University by the MIT Press
2011
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64696 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3164-0855 |
| _version_ | 1826215196334489600 |
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| author | Athey, Susan Ellison, Glenn |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Athey, Susan Ellison, Glenn |
| author_sort | Athey, Susan |
| collection | MIT |
| description | This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on
a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming
from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about rm qualities
and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare
benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:18:42Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/64696 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:18:42Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Harvard University by the MIT Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/646962022-09-29T19:29:50Z Position Auctions with Consumer Search Athey, Susan Ellison, Glenn Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Ellison, Glenn Ellison, Glenn Athey, Susan This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about rm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed. National Science Foundation (U.S.) (grant SES-0550897) National Science Foundation (U.S.) (grant SES-0351500) Toulouse Network for Information Technology 2011-06-28T20:10:08Z 2011-06-28T20:10:08Z 2011 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0033-5533 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64696 Athey, Susan and Glenn Ellison."Position Auctions with Consumer Search." Quarterly Journal of Economics (2011) 126 (3): 1213-1270. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3164-0855 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr028 Quarterly Journal of Economics Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Harvard University by the MIT Press Prof. Ellison via Kate McNeill |
| spellingShingle | Athey, Susan Ellison, Glenn Position Auctions with Consumer Search |
| title | Position Auctions with Consumer Search |
| title_full | Position Auctions with Consumer Search |
| title_fullStr | Position Auctions with Consumer Search |
| title_full_unstemmed | Position Auctions with Consumer Search |
| title_short | Position Auctions with Consumer Search |
| title_sort | position auctions with consumer search |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64696 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3164-0855 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT atheysusan positionauctionswithconsumersearch AT ellisonglenn positionauctionswithconsumersearch |