School Governance, Teacher Incentives, and Pupil-Teacher Ratios: Experimental Evidence from Kenyan Primary Schools

School Governance, Teacher Incentives, and Pupil-Teacher Ratios: Experimental Evidence from Kenyan Primary Schools

We examine a program that enabled Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) in Kenya to hire novice teachers on short-term contracts, reducing class sizes in grade one from 82 to 44 on average. PTA teachers earned approximately one-quarter as much as teachers operating under central government civil-servic...

Täydet tiedot

Bibliografiset tiedot
Päätekijät: Duflo, Esther, Dupas, Pascaline, Kremer, Michael
Aineistotyyppi: Working Paper
Julkaistu: Cambridge, MA: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2012
Aiheet:
contract teachers
PTA
School-Based Management
teacher effort
test score gain
nepotism
corruption
decentralization
institutions
Linkit:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/69645

Internet

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/69645

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