Bargaining with Optimism

Excessive optimism is a prominent explanation for bargaining delays. Recent results demonstrate that optimism plays a subtle role in bargaining, and its careful analysis may shed valuable insights into negotiation behavior. This article reviews some of these results, focusing on the following findin...

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Main Author: Yildiz, Muhamet
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Annual Reviews 2012
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/75393
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7637-7117
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author Yildiz, Muhamet
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Yildiz, Muhamet
author_sort Yildiz, Muhamet
collection MIT
description Excessive optimism is a prominent explanation for bargaining delays. Recent results demonstrate that optimism plays a subtle role in bargaining, and its careful analysis may shed valuable insights into negotiation behavior. This article reviews some of these results, focusing on the following findings. First, when there is a nearby deadline, optimistic players delay the agreement to the last period before the deadline, replicating a broad empirical regularity known as the deadline effect. Second, there cannot be a substantial delay under persistent optimism; i.e., excessive optimism alone cannot explain delays. Third, when optimistic players are expected to learn during the negotiation, they delay the agreement in order to persuade their opponents. The delays in these results can be quite costly, Pareto inefficient, and common knowledge at the beginning of the game.
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spelling mit-1721.1/753932022-10-01T02:40:36Z Bargaining with Optimism Yildiz, Muhamet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Yildiz, Muhamet Yildiz, Muhamet Excessive optimism is a prominent explanation for bargaining delays. Recent results demonstrate that optimism plays a subtle role in bargaining, and its careful analysis may shed valuable insights into negotiation behavior. This article reviews some of these results, focusing on the following findings. First, when there is a nearby deadline, optimistic players delay the agreement to the last period before the deadline, replicating a broad empirical regularity known as the deadline effect. Second, there cannot be a substantial delay under persistent optimism; i.e., excessive optimism alone cannot explain delays. Third, when optimistic players are expected to learn during the negotiation, they delay the agreement in order to persuade their opponents. The delays in these results can be quite costly, Pareto inefficient, and common knowledge at the beginning of the game. 2012-12-11T17:11:34Z 2012-12-11T17:11:34Z 2011-05 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1941-1383 1941-1391 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/75393 Yildiz, Muhamet. “Bargaining with Optimism.” Annual Review of Economics 3.1 (2011): 451–478. Web. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7637-7117 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080334 Annual Review of Economics Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Annual Reviews Yildiz via Kate McNeill
spellingShingle Yildiz, Muhamet
Bargaining with Optimism
title Bargaining with Optimism
title_full Bargaining with Optimism
title_fullStr Bargaining with Optimism
title_full_unstemmed Bargaining with Optimism
title_short Bargaining with Optimism
title_sort bargaining with optimism
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/75393
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7637-7117
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