Dynamic Online-Advertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling

We study dynamic models of online-advertising auctions in the Internet: advertisers compete for space on a web page over multiple time periods, and the web page displays ads in differentiated slots based on their bids and other considerations. The complex interactions between the advertisers and the...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Menache, Ishai, Ozdaglar, Asuman E., Srikant, R., Acemoglu, Daron
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: 2014
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87056
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1827-1285
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491
_version_ 1826214057241214976
author Menache, Ishai
Ozdaglar, Asuman E.
Srikant, R.
Acemoglu, Daron
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Menache, Ishai
Ozdaglar, Asuman E.
Srikant, R.
Acemoglu, Daron
author_sort Menache, Ishai
collection MIT
description We study dynamic models of online-advertising auctions in the Internet: advertisers compete for space on a web page over multiple time periods, and the web page displays ads in differentiated slots based on their bids and other considerations. The complex interactions between the advertisers and the website (which owns the web page) is modeled as a dynamic game. Our goal is to derive ad-slot placement and pricing strategies which maximize the expected revenue of the website. We show that the problem can be transformed into a scheduling problem familiar to queueing theorists. When only one advertising slot is available on a webpage, we derive the optimal revenue-maximizing solution by making connections to the familiar cμ rule used in queueing theory. More generally, we show that a cμ-like rule can serve as a good suboptimal solution, while the optimal solution itself may be computed using dynamic programming techniques.
first_indexed 2024-09-23T15:59:07Z
format Article
id mit-1721.1/87056
institution Massachusetts Institute of Technology
language en_US
last_indexed 2024-09-23T15:59:07Z
publishDate 2014
record_format dspace
spelling mit-1721.1/870562022-09-29T17:27:18Z Dynamic Online-Advertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling Menache, Ishai Ozdaglar, Asuman E. Srikant, R. Acemoglu, Daron Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Menache, Ishai Ozdaglar, Asuman E. Acemoglu, Daron We study dynamic models of online-advertising auctions in the Internet: advertisers compete for space on a web page over multiple time periods, and the web page displays ads in differentiated slots based on their bids and other considerations. The complex interactions between the advertisers and the website (which owns the web page) is modeled as a dynamic game. Our goal is to derive ad-slot placement and pricing strategies which maximize the expected revenue of the website. We show that the problem can be transformed into a scheduling problem familiar to queueing theorists. When only one advertising slot is available on a webpage, we derive the optimal revenue-maximizing solution by making connections to the familiar cμ rule used in queueing theory. More generally, we show that a cμ-like rule can serve as a good suboptimal solution, while the optimal solution itself may be computed using dynamic programming techniques. 2014-05-19T19:34:38Z 2014-05-19T19:34:38Z 2009-07 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87056 Menache, Ishai, Asuman Ozdaglar, R. Srikant, and Daron Acemoglu. "Dynamic Online-Advertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling." Proceedings of the NetEcon '09: Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation, Stanford, California, July 7, 2009. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1827-1285 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 en_US http://netecon.seas.harvard.edu/NetEcon09/index09.html Proceedings of the NetEcon '09: Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf MIT web domain
spellingShingle Menache, Ishai
Ozdaglar, Asuman E.
Srikant, R.
Acemoglu, Daron
Dynamic Online-Advertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling
title Dynamic Online-Advertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling
title_full Dynamic Online-Advertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling
title_fullStr Dynamic Online-Advertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic Online-Advertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling
title_short Dynamic Online-Advertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling
title_sort dynamic online advertising auctions as stochastic scheduling
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87056
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1827-1285
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491
work_keys_str_mv AT menacheishai dynamiconlineadvertisingauctionsasstochasticscheduling
AT ozdaglarasumane dynamiconlineadvertisingauctionsasstochasticscheduling
AT srikantr dynamiconlineadvertisingauctionsasstochasticscheduling
AT acemogludaron dynamiconlineadvertisingauctionsasstochasticscheduling