Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms

We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms on m unrelated machines, to minimize some optimization goal. Nisan and Ronen [Nisan, N., A. Ronen. 2001. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games Econom. Behav. 35 166–196] consider the specific goal of makespan minimization, and show a lower bound...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ashlagi, Itai, Dobzinski, Shahar, Lavi, Ron
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) 2014
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87602
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X