On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes

We address the problem of auditing an election when precincts may have different sizes, and suggest methods for picking a sample of precincts to audit that takes precinct size into account. one method yields optimal auditing strategies together with an exact measure of its effectiveness (probability...

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Main Author: Rivest, Ronald L.
Format: Working Paper
Language:en_US
Published: Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/96592
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author Rivest, Ronald L.
author_facet Rivest, Ronald L.
author_sort Rivest, Ronald L.
collection MIT
description We address the problem of auditing an election when precincts may have different sizes, and suggest methods for picking a sample of precincts to audit that takes precinct size into account. one method yields optimal auditing strategies together with an exact measure of its effectiveness (probability of detecting corruption of a given size). We restrict attention to basic auditing strategies, in which each precinct P is audited independently with some probability p determined by the auditor. The auditing probability for a precinct will depend on the size of the precinct, with larger precincts audited more frequently; when all precincts have the same size they will have the same probability of being audited.
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spelling mit-1721.1/965922019-04-11T06:37:34Z On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes Rivest, Ronald L. Auditing elections Precinct sizes Sampling Auditing strategies We address the problem of auditing an election when precincts may have different sizes, and suggest methods for picking a sample of precincts to audit that takes precinct size into account. one method yields optimal auditing strategies together with an exact measure of its effectiveness (probability of detecting corruption of a given size). We restrict attention to basic auditing strategies, in which each precinct P is audited independently with some probability p determined by the auditor. The auditing probability for a precinct will depend on the size of the precinct, with larger precincts audited more frequently; when all precincts have the same size they will have the same probability of being audited. 2015-04-15T11:56:34Z 2015-04-15T11:56:34Z 2007-04-29 Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/96592 en_US VTP Working Paper Series;55 application/pdf Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project
spellingShingle Auditing elections
Precinct sizes
Sampling
Auditing strategies
Rivest, Ronald L.
On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes
title On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes
title_full On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes
title_fullStr On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes
title_full_unstemmed On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes
title_short On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes
title_sort on auditing elections when precincts have different sizes
topic Auditing elections
Precinct sizes
Sampling
Auditing strategies
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/96592
work_keys_str_mv AT rivestronaldl onauditingelectionswhenprecinctshavedifferentsizes