Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization

Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization

We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in multidimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary - possibly combinatorial - feasibility constraints and independent bidders with arbitrary - possibly combinatorial-demand constraints, appropriately extending Myerson's...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Cai, Yang, Daskalakis, Konstantinos, Weinberg, Seth Matthew
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 2015
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99955
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490

Internet

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99955
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490

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