The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design

The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design

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Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders [18]. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic game theory, but its complexity has remained poorl...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Deckelbaum, Alan, Tzamos, Christos, Daskalakis, Konstantinos
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics 2015
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99968
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7560-5069
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490

Internet

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99968
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7560-5069
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490

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