Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms

We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with approximation factors of 2 and min{m - k + 1, [~ over O](√k)} respectively, matching the approximation ratios of bes...

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Bibliografiska uppgifter
Huvudupphovsmän: Daskalakis, Konstantinos, Weinberg, Seth Matthew
Övriga upphovsmän: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Materialtyp: Artikel
Språk:en_US
Publicerad: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics 2015
Länkar:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99972
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490