Wittgenstein and phenomenal concepts
Many philosophers think that there are phenomenal concepts: distinctive ways of thinking of experiences or sensations that can be grasped only by those who know what it is like to have those experiences or sensations. What light does Wittgenstein’s philosophy throw on this idea? In the literature, p...
Váldodahkki: | Child, T |
---|---|
Materiálatiipa: | Book section |
Almmustuhtton: |
Routledge
2015
|
Geahča maid
-
What We Can Learn about Phenomenal Concepts from Wittgenstein’s Private Language
Dahkki: Roberto Sá Pereira
Almmustuhtton: (2016-11-01) -
Wittgenstein, seeing-as, and novelty
Dahkki: Child, T
Almmustuhtton: (2018) -
Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts
Dahkki: André Joffily Abath
Almmustuhtton: (2010-05-01) -
Phenomenal Knowledge without Phenomenal Concepts? On Jesse Prinz’ Theory of Mental Pointers
Dahkki: Barberis, Sergio Daniel
Almmustuhtton: (2011-05-01) -
Wittgenstein, scientism and anti-scientism in the philosophy of mind
Dahkki: Child, T
Almmustuhtton: (2017)