Simultaneous contests with equal sharing allocation of prizes: computational complexity and price of anarchy
We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as the number of winners increases. The players produce output...
المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | Elkind, E, Ghosh, A, Goldberg, PW |
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التنسيق: | Conference item |
اللغة: | English |
منشور في: |
Springer
2022
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مواد مشابهة
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