Defeasible knowledge
<p>This dissertation collects five papers that discuss potential consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5 provide arguments for a number of important epistemological consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 4 discusses consequences that others have...
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| 格式: | Thesis |
| 语言: | English |
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2014
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| 总结: | <p>This dissertation collects five papers that discuss potential consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5 provide arguments for a number of important epistemological consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 4 discusses consequences that others have claimed the defeasibility of knowledge to have. Chapter 1 argues that closure principles for knowledge are in tension with the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 2 argues that one of Williamson's famous arguments against the KK principle relies in a problematic way on a closure principle that is incompatible with defeat. Chapter 3 argues that a view on which knowledge just is belief safe from error is in tension the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 4 discusses two arguments to the effect that defeat by higher-order evidence sometimes involves the violation of rational ideals or rules of rational belief formation. As part of a response to an objection to contextualism about 'know', Chapter 5 investigates a number of social epistemological consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge.</p> |
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