Stochastic evolution with slow learning
This paper studies the extent to which diffusion approximations provide a reliable guide to equilibrium selection results in finite games. It is shown that they do for a class of finite games with weak learning provided that limits are taken in a certain order. The paper also shows that making mutat...
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
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| বিন্যাস: | Working paper |
| প্রকাশিত: |
University of Oxford
2000
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| সংক্ষিপ্ত: | This paper studies the extent to which diffusion approximations provide a reliable guide to equilibrium selection results in finite games. It is shown that they do for a class of finite games with weak learning provided that limits are taken in a certain order. The paper also shows that making mutation rates small does not in general select a unique equilibrium but making selection strong does. |
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