Positive harmony transformations and equilibrium selection in two-player games
Game harmony is a generic game property that describes how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs. It can be used to predict cooperation in two-player games. We show how, for large enough positive harmony transformations o...
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Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2004
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author | Zizzo, D |
author_facet | Zizzo, D |
author_sort | Zizzo, D |
collection | OXFORD |
description | Game harmony is a generic game property that describes how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs. It can be used to predict cooperation in two-player games. We show how, for large enough positive harmony transformations of the game, a utilitarian solution is always a Nash equilibrium, coincides with the Nash bargaining solution and acquires further desirable properties of payoff and risk dominance. Case-based reasoning and team reasoning are alternative mechanisms by which game harmony measures can successfully predict cooperative behavior. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:50:23Z |
format | Working paper |
id | oxford-uuid:4b0c2a34-9de0-4455-bdca-c24b2aa2b37f |
institution | University of Oxford |
last_indexed | 2024-03-06T21:50:23Z |
publishDate | 2004 |
publisher | University of Oxford |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:4b0c2a34-9de0-4455-bdca-c24b2aa2b37f2022-03-26T15:41:12ZPositive harmony transformations and equilibrium selection in two-player gamesWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:4b0c2a34-9de0-4455-bdca-c24b2aa2b37fBulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2004Zizzo, DGame harmony is a generic game property that describes how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of players are, as embodied in the payoffs. It can be used to predict cooperation in two-player games. We show how, for large enough positive harmony transformations of the game, a utilitarian solution is always a Nash equilibrium, coincides with the Nash bargaining solution and acquires further desirable properties of payoff and risk dominance. Case-based reasoning and team reasoning are alternative mechanisms by which game harmony measures can successfully predict cooperative behavior. |
spellingShingle | Zizzo, D Positive harmony transformations and equilibrium selection in two-player games |
title | Positive harmony transformations and equilibrium selection in two-player games |
title_full | Positive harmony transformations and equilibrium selection in two-player games |
title_fullStr | Positive harmony transformations and equilibrium selection in two-player games |
title_full_unstemmed | Positive harmony transformations and equilibrium selection in two-player games |
title_short | Positive harmony transformations and equilibrium selection in two-player games |
title_sort | positive harmony transformations and equilibrium selection in two player games |
work_keys_str_mv | AT zizzod positiveharmonytransformationsandequilibriumselectionintwoplayergames |