Principal and Expert Agent.
This paper analyses principal-agent contracts when the agent's action generates information not directly verifiable but used by the agent to make a risky decision. It considers a more general formulation than those studied previously, focusing on the impact on the decision made and the contract...
Главный автор: | Malcomson, J |
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Формат: | Working paper |
Язык: | English |
Опубликовано: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2004
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