Are generics quantificational?
The standard view about generic generalizations is that they have a tripartite quantificational logical form involving a phonologically null quantificational expression called ‘Gen’. However, proponents of the cognitive defaults theory of generics have forcefully rejected this view, instead arguing...
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
|---|---|
| বিন্যাস: | Journal article |
| ভাষা: | English |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Springer
2024
|
| _version_ | 1826313523331858432 |
|---|---|
| author | Kirkpatrick, JR |
| author_facet | Kirkpatrick, JR |
| author_sort | Kirkpatrick, JR |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The standard view about generic generalizations is that they have a tripartite quantificational logical form involving a phonologically null quantificational expression called ‘Gen’. However, proponents of the cognitive defaults theory of generics have forcefully rejected this view, instead arguing that generics express the default generalizations of our cognitive system, and, as such, they are different in kind from quantificational generalizations. While extant criticism of the cognitive defaults theory has focused on the extent to which it is supported by the empirical evidence, there has been little discussion of a neglected, albeit essential, theoretical argument in its defence, namely, that generics cannot be quantificational because they lack a central logical property of quantifiers: isomorphism invariance. This paper addresses this lacuna by considering and rejecting this argument. Consequently, an essential argument in favour of the cognitive default theory is found wanting. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-25T04:15:29Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:6b5b894f-2bf0-431c-846e-8bccab54ab75 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-25T04:15:29Z |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:6b5b894f-2bf0-431c-846e-8bccab54ab752024-07-18T09:09:23ZAre generics quantificational?Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:6b5b894f-2bf0-431c-846e-8bccab54ab75EnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer2024Kirkpatrick, JRThe standard view about generic generalizations is that they have a tripartite quantificational logical form involving a phonologically null quantificational expression called ‘Gen’. However, proponents of the cognitive defaults theory of generics have forcefully rejected this view, instead arguing that generics express the default generalizations of our cognitive system, and, as such, they are different in kind from quantificational generalizations. While extant criticism of the cognitive defaults theory has focused on the extent to which it is supported by the empirical evidence, there has been little discussion of a neglected, albeit essential, theoretical argument in its defence, namely, that generics cannot be quantificational because they lack a central logical property of quantifiers: isomorphism invariance. This paper addresses this lacuna by considering and rejecting this argument. Consequently, an essential argument in favour of the cognitive default theory is found wanting. |
| spellingShingle | Kirkpatrick, JR Are generics quantificational? |
| title | Are generics quantificational? |
| title_full | Are generics quantificational? |
| title_fullStr | Are generics quantificational? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Are generics quantificational? |
| title_short | Are generics quantificational? |
| title_sort | are generics quantificational |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kirkpatrickjr aregenericsquantificational |