The procreation asymmetry, improvable-life avoidance and impairable-life acceptance
Many philosophers are attracted to a complaints-based theory of the procreation asymmetry, according to which creating a person with a bad life is wrong (all else equal) because that person can complain about your act, whereas declining to create a person who would have a good life is not wrong (all...
Auteur principal: | Thornley, E |
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Format: | Journal article |
Langue: | English |
Publié: |
Oxford University Press
2023
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