Expressiveness and Nash equilibrium in iterated Boolean games
We introduce and investigate a novel notion of expressiveness related to temporal logics and game theoretic properties of multi-agent systems. We focus on iterated Boolean games, where each agent
Autori principali: | Gutierrez, J, Harrenstein, P, Perelli, G, Wooldridge, M |
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Natura: | Conference item |
Pubblicazione: |
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
2016
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