Prosocial preferences do not explain human cooperation in public-goods games
It has become an accepted paradigm that humans have "prosocial preferences" that lead to higher levels of cooperation than those that would maximize their personal financial gain. However, the existence of prosocial preferences has been inferred post hoc from the results of economic games,...
Հիմնական հեղինակներ: | Burton-Chellew, M, West, S |
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Ձևաչափ: | Journal article |
Լեզու: | English |
Հրապարակվել է: |
National Academy of Sciences
2012
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Նմանատիպ նյութեր
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Prosocial preferences do not explain human cooperation in public-goods games.
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Հրապարակվել է: (2013) -
Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.
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Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games
: Burton-Chellew, M, և այլն
Հրապարակվել է: (2015) -
Payoff-based learning best explains the rate of decline in cooperation across 237 public-goods games
: Burton-Chellew, M, և այլն
Հրապարակվել է: (2021) -
Pseudocompetition among groups increases human cooperation in a public-goods game
: Burton-Chellew, M, և այլն
Հրապարակվել է: (2012)