Uncommon knowledge
<p>This dissertation collects four papers on common knowledge and one on introspection principles in epistemic game theory. The first two papers offer a sustained argument against the importance of common knowledge and belief in explaining social behavior. Chapters 3 and 4 study the role of co...
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| Định dạng: | Luận văn |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
2014
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| Tóm tắt: | <p>This dissertation collects four papers on common knowledge and one on introspection principles in epistemic game theory. The first two papers offer a sustained argument against the importance of common knowledge and belief in explaining social behavior. Chapters 3 and 4 study the role of common knowledge of tautologies in standard models in epistemic logic and game theory. The first considers the problem as it relates to Robert Aumann’s Agreement Theorem; the second (joint work with Peter Fritz) studies it in models of awareness. The fifth paper corrects a claimed Agreement Theorem of Geanakoplos (1989), and exploits the corrected theorem to provide epistemic conditions for correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.</p> |
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