The Doomsday argument and the self-indication assumption: reply to Olum
In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the Doomsday argument by appealing to the self-indication assumption (SIA), the idea that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. In contrast to earlier refutation attempts that use this strategy, Olu...
Egile Nagusiak: | Bostrom, N, Ćirković, M |
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Beste egile batzuk: | Scots Philosophical Club |
Formatua: | Journal article |
Hizkuntza: | English |
Argitaratua: |
Blackwell Publishing
2003
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Gaiak: |
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