The Doomsday argument and the self-indication assumption: reply to Olum
In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the Doomsday argument by appealing to the self-indication assumption (SIA), the idea that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. In contrast to earlier refutation attempts that use this strategy, Olu...
主要な著者: | Bostrom, N, Ćirković, M |
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その他の著者: | Scots Philosophical Club |
フォーマット: | Journal article |
言語: | English |
出版事項: |
Blackwell Publishing
2003
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主題: |
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