Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management
This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequently receives private information regarding the productivity of the capital investment. The capital manager must decide whether to invest capital supplied by the firm (the principal), or to divert th...
Asıl Yazarlar: | Noe, T, Nachman, D |
---|---|
Materyal Türü: | Journal article |
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
1995
|
Benzer Materyaller
-
Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management
Yazar:: Noe, T, ve diğerleri
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: (1995) -
Output, employment, capital, and growth : a quantitative analysis /
Yazar:: 462763 Brems, Hans
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: (1973) -
Early output quasi-delay-insensitive array multipliers
Yazar:: Balasubramanian, Padmanabhan, ve diğerleri
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: (2019) -
The structure and evolution of production, employment and human capital in Portugal: an input‑output approach
Yazar:: João Carlos Lopes, ve diğerleri
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: (2013-12-01) -
The Visualized Employment Contract. An Exploratory Study on Contract Visualization in Danish Employment Contracts
Yazar:: Maria Jose Schmidt-Kessen, ve diğerleri
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: (2021-10-01)