International R&D; Rivalry and Industrial Strategy without Government Commitment.
We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D; and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home e...
Príomhchruthaitheoirí: | Leahy, D, Neary, J |
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Formáid: | Working paper |
Teanga: | English |
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
CEPR
1995
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