Coalition formation in general apex games
We generalize the class of apex game by combining a winning coalition of symmetric minor players with a collection of apex sets which can form winning coalitions only together with a fixed quota of minor players. By applying power indices to these games and their subgames we generate players'...
מחבר ראשי: | Karos, D |
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פורמט: | Working paper |
יצא לאור: |
University of Oxford
2013
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