Regularity and Stability in Monotone Bayesian Games
This paper denes regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with with one-dimensional actions and types. It proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium. It also provides analyses of stability with respect to perturbations and dynamic stabilit...
المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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التنسيق: | Working paper |
اللغة: | English |
منشور في: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2011
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الملخص: | This paper denes regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with with one-dimensional actions and types. It proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium. It also provides analyses of stability with respect to perturbations and dynamic stability. |
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