Synthesis of controllable nash equilibria in games with quantitative objectives
In Rational Synthesis, we consider a multi-agent system in which some of the agents are controllable and some are not. All agents have objectives, and the goal is to synthesize strategies for the controllable agents so that their objectives are satisfied, assuming rationality of the uncontrollable a...
Autors principals: | Almagor, S, Kupferman, O, Perelli, G |
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Format: | Conference item |
Publicat: |
International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
2018
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