Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the primary auction used for monetizing the use of the Internet. It is well-known that truthtelling is not a dominant strategy in this auction and that inefficient equilibria can arise. Edelman et al. (2007) [11] and Varian (2007) [36] show that an effic...
Autors principals: | Caragiannis, I, Kaklamanis, C, Kanellopoulos, P, Kyropoulou, M, Lucier, B, Paes Leme, R, Tardos, É |
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Format: | Journal article |
Publicat: |
Elsevier
2014
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