Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte fur Mathematik 110, 1990, 189-206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141-162) provide conditions for the stability of rest points unde...
मुख्य लेखक: | Norman, T |
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स्वरूप: | Working paper |
प्रकाशित: |
University of Oxford
2005
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समान संसाधन
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