Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte fur Mathematik 110, 1990, 189-206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141-162) provide conditions for the stability of rest points unde...

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מחבר ראשי: Norman, T
פורמט: Working paper
יצא לאור: University of Oxford 2005
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Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. מאת Norman, T

יצא לאור 2008
Journal article
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Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. מאת Norman, T

יצא לאור 2008
Journal article
Search Result 3