Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte fur Mathematik 110, 1990, 189-206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141-162) provide conditions for the stability of rest points unde...

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Бібліографічні деталі
Автор: Norman, T
Формат: Working paper
Опубліковано: University of Oxford 2005
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Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. за авторством Norman, T

Опубліковано 2008
Journal article
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Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. за авторством Norman, T

Опубліковано 2008
Journal article
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Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces. за авторством Norman, T

Опубліковано 2005
Working paper