Dynamic contracting: An irrelevance theorem
This paper generalizes a conceptual insight in dynamic contracting with quasilinear payoffs: the principal does not need to pay any information rents for extracting the agent's “new” private information obtained after signing the contract. This is shown in a general model in which the agent...
Asıl Yazarlar: | Eső, P, Szentes, B |
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Materyal Türü: | Journal article |
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Econometric Society
2017
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