Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias...
Autors principals: | Meyer, M, Moreno De Barreda, I, Nafziger, J |
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Format: | Journal article |
Publicat: |
Wiley
2019
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