Knowability and constructivism
If anti-realism is defined as the principle that all truths are knowable, then anti-realists have a reason to revise logic. For an argument first published by Fitch seems to reduce anti-realism to absurdity within classical but not constructivist logic. One might try to sever this link between anti-...
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| Μορφή: | Journal article |
| Γλώσσα: | English |
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Blackwell Publishing
1988
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| Περίληψη: | If anti-realism is defined as the principle that all truths are knowable, then anti-realists have a reason to revise logic. For an argument first published by Fitch seems to reduce anti-realism to absurdity within classical but not constructivist logic. One might try to sever this link between anti-realism and revisionism in logic by giving either a modified version of anti-realism not vulnerable to Fitch's argument within classical logic or a modified version of Fitch's argument to which anti-realism is vulnerable within constructivist logic. |
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