| Crynodeb: | <p>This thesis concerns interim or deliberately temporary constitutional texts. I argue that interim constitutions are a new form of constitutional text, with unique possibilities and pitfalls. I explore the argument that interim constitutions represent an attempt to forge a more legitimate constitutional structure, through a two-stage drafting procedure, heightened judicial oversight, an increased role for international law and institutions, a mutual interdependence with transitional justice mechanisms, and greater popular involvement. I contend that interim constitutions are a coherent but diverse group, united by the distinct consequences of the adoption of a temporary constitution. The thesis draws upon case study interim constitutions as adopted in Poland, Hungary, Albania, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Sudan, Thailand, and Nepal. On the basis of a comparative analysis of these case studies, it is argued that the two-staged drafting process embodied by interim constitutions can allow for greater constitutional legitimacy, sophistication, flexibility, and effective peace-building. A number of potential difficulties associated with interim constitutions are also discussed, including cases where interim constitutions are not succeeded by final constitutions, and lapse into permanence. In the context of the increasing popularity of interim constitutional texts, this thesis is the first major comparative study across a wide range of interim texts, and represents an attempt to understand the myriad legal and theoretical issues involved.</p>
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