Living with moral disagreement
This paper argues that suspension of judgement is the appropriate response to disagreement about ultimate moral principles, and outlines the implications of such a response. It begins with an argument influenced by Sextus and Sidgwick for the rationality of suspension, and then illustrates fundament...
Autore principale: | Crisp, R |
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Natura: | Journal article |
Lingua: | English |
Pubblicazione: |
Springer Verlag
2020
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