Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs.
In many markets consumers have transaction or learning "switching costs" between functionally undifferentiated brands. New entry into such markets may be deterred either by large customer bases and/or large switching costs, which deny customers to an entrant, or by small customer bases and...
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| Materialtyp: | Journal article |
| Språk: | English |
| Publicerad: |
1987
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| _version_ | 1826301882441662464 |
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| author | Klemperer, P |
| author_facet | Klemperer, P |
| author_sort | Klemperer, P |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | In many markets consumers have transaction or learning "switching costs" between functionally undifferentiated brands. New entry into such markets may be deterred either by large customer bases and/or large switching costs, which deny customers to an entrant, or by small customer bases and/or small switching costs, which mean an incumbent will respond aggressively to an entrant. An incumbent threatened by entry may therefore price either lower or higher than otherwise. A firm with the right to enter early may make less profits over time than an otherwise identical firm that is unable to enter the market until later. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:39:07Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:e4f31b78-1e99-44ec-ae89-a3bdb33afe6d |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:39:07Z |
| publishDate | 1987 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:e4f31b78-1e99-44ec-ae89-a3bdb33afe6d2022-03-27T10:20:19ZEntry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:e4f31b78-1e99-44ec-ae89-a3bdb33afe6dEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints1987Klemperer, PIn many markets consumers have transaction or learning "switching costs" between functionally undifferentiated brands. New entry into such markets may be deterred either by large customer bases and/or large switching costs, which deny customers to an entrant, or by small customer bases and/or small switching costs, which mean an incumbent will respond aggressively to an entrant. An incumbent threatened by entry may therefore price either lower or higher than otherwise. A firm with the right to enter early may make less profits over time than an otherwise identical firm that is unable to enter the market until later. |
| spellingShingle | Klemperer, P Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs. |
| title | Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs. |
| title_full | Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs. |
| title_fullStr | Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs. |
| title_short | Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs. |
| title_sort | entry deterrence in markets with consumer switching costs |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT klempererp entrydeterrenceinmarketswithconsumerswitchingcosts |