Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
I propose a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to find solutions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities. I show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, a c...
第一著者: | Karos, D |
---|---|
フォーマット: | Journal article |
言語: | English |
出版事項: |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2015
|
類似資料
-
Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utilities and externalities
著者:: Karos, D
出版事項: (2015) -
Consumer Flexibility Aggregation Using Partition Function Games With Non-Transferable Utility
著者:: Tiago Pinto, 等
出版事項: (2021-01-01) -
Coalition formation in general apex games
著者:: Karos, D
出版事項: (2013) -
An elementary transfers procedure for sharing the joint surplus in games with externalities
著者:: Joss Erick Sánchez-Pérez
出版事項: (2023-07-01) -
Coordinated adoption of social innovations
著者:: Karos, D
出版事項: (2016)