Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
I propose a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to find solutions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities. I show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, a c...
Главный автор: | Karos, D |
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Формат: | Journal article |
Язык: | English |
Опубликовано: |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2015
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