The Evolution of Collective Action.
A public good is produced if and only if a team of m or more volunteers contribute to it. An equilibrium-selection problem leads to the questions: will the collective action succeed? If so, who will participate in the team? The paper studies the evolution of collective action: as part of a strategy-...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | Myatt, D, Wallace, C |
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Μορφή: | Working paper |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2005
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Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
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The evolution of collective action
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Έκδοση: (2005) -
Evolution, Teamwork and Collective Action: Production Targets in the Private Provision of Public Goods.
ανά: Myatt, D, κ.ά.
Έκδοση: (2009) -
When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action.
ανά: Myatt, D, κ.ά.
Έκδοση: (2008) -
When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action.
ανά: Myatt, D, κ.ά.
Έκδοση: (2006) -
When does one bad apple spoil the barrel? An evolutionary analysis of collective action
ανά: Myatt, D, κ.ά.
Έκδοση: (2006)