Why Phenomenal Zombies Are Conceivable Whereas Anti-Zombies Are not
In this article, I discuss Keith Frankish’s attempt to neutralize the zombie argument against materialism with a closely parallel argument for physicalism, the anti-zombie argument, and develop David Chalmers’ reply to this species of arguments. I support Chalmers’ claim that the conceivability of...
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| Format: | Article |
| Langue: | English |
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Academy of Cognitive and Natural Sciences
2019-11-01
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| Collection: | Актуальні проблеми духовності |
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| Accès en ligne: | https://journal.kdpu.edu.ua/apd/article/view/2598 |
| Résumé: | In this article, I discuss Keith Frankish’s attempt to neutralize the zombie argument against materialism with a closely parallel argument for physicalism, the anti-zombie argument, and develop David Chalmers’ reply to this species of arguments. I support Chalmers’ claim that the conceivability of situations like the existence of an anti-zombie is problematic with an analysis that makes it plausible that the idea of an anti-zombie is incoherent, and argue that to counter this, a materialist should deny the absence of a priori entailment from the physical to the phenomenal; however, this would involve the denial of the conceivability of zombies and so make the anti-zombie argument superfluous.
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| ISSN: | 2076-7382 2522-4786 |